Kenya, ethnic diversity, and fractionalization scores

Had you taken my Introduction to Comparative Politics class in the fall of 2007, you would have been faced with writing a paper in response to this:

There is much debate regarding the determinants of, and obstacles to, democratization. Are states that rely on natural resources for a large share of their GDP less likely to become and remain democratic? Does ethnic diversity present an obstacle to the democratization and democratic consolidation of a regime? Your term paper will answer one of these two questions either in the affirmative or the negative.

In addition to making the theoretical argument, students were asked to use Iraq and one other state to illustrate and support their argument(s). A few students chose to write on Kenya. I hope they go back and read their papers in light of the current situation in that multi-ethnic state.

Is Kenya ethnically diverse? How can we measure ethnic (or religious, or linguistic) diversity? There is a formula called the fractionalization index, which essentially gives us an idea of how diverse a state is. You can find a table–in Appendix A (which I have excerpted here) of over 100 states around the world with their corresponding fractionalization scores (in three categories), in this National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) paper by Alesina et al. here The higher the value the higher the level of diversity. Notice the relatively low diversity of states like Poland and Norway and the high amount of diversity of almost all African states. Which is the best way to measure “diversity”? Ethnically? Linguistically? By religion?


Country
Date (Ethnicity Data)
Ethnic
Language
Religion
Afghanistan
1995
0.7693
0.6141
0.2717
Canada
1991
0.7124
0.5772
0.6958
China
1990
0.1538
0.1327
0.6643
Croatia
1991
0.3690
0.0763
0.4447
Kenya
2001
0.8588
0.8860
0.7765
Malawi
1998
0.6744
0.6023
0.8192
Mozambique
1983
0.6932
0.8125
0.6759
Nigeria
1983
0.8505
0.8503
0.7421
Norway
1998
0.0586
0.0673
0.2048
Portugal
1998
0.0468
0.0198
0.1438
USA
2000
0.4901
0.2514
0.8241

Debaathification redux

In an earlier post, I noted that the Iraqi parliament had passed a law allowing the re-hiring of rank-and-file members of the Baathist party, who had lost their jobs in one fell swoop as a result of a decision by Paul Bremer in the immediate aftermath of the US-led invasion. As has been the case on numerous prior occasions in Iraq, the news may not be as good as originally hoped. From the NY Times we find:

A day after the Iraqi Parliament passed legislation billed as the first significant political step forward in Iraq after months of deadlock, there were troubling questions — and troubling silences — about the measure’s actual effects.

The measure, known as the Justice and Accountability Law, is meant to open government jobs to former members of the Baath Party of Saddam Hussein — the bureaucrats, engineers, city workers, teachers, soldiers and police officers who made the government work until they were barred from office after the American invasion in 2003.

But the legislation is at once confusing and controversial, a document riddled with loopholes and caveats to the point that some Sunni and Shiite officials say it could actually exclude more former Baathists than it lets back in, particularly in the crucial security ministries.

Once again, the crux of the issue in Iraq is the sectional and interethnic struggle amongst Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, and non-Arab Kurds, and who get what, when, and where. There are no easy answers.

Coalition Government set to be Formed in Croatia

In a previous post, I noted the relatively democratic nature of the post-election bargaining amongst the various parties, coalitions, and options. Party leaders and other officials assured the public that a new governing coalition would be sworn in before the expiration of the constitutionally-mandated period. This has, indeed, been the case with an 83-member coalition government presiding over the Croatian Parliament’s (Sabor) 153-seat single chamber. The Financial Times reports on some highlights of the new government:

he prime minister, who has governed in a minority coalition for the past four years, secured a slender parliamentary majority through deals earlier this week with the Peasants and Social Liberal parties and the Serb ethnic-minority party.

Other ethnic-minority representatives and a pensioners’ party member bring the new governing coalition to a comfortable 83-seat total.

A Serb member enters the cabinet for the first time as one of four deputy prime ministers, while the new governing coalition also includes the first-ever member of parliament from the Roma minority.

Ethnicity and Democratic Stability

Ethnic identity and the interaction of ethnic groups form form the basis of a disparate and burgeoning literature in the field of comparative politics (and economics, sociology, psychology, etc.) Two important sub-literatures in this field analyze the effect of ethnicity, and ethnic homogeneity and democratic stability. The first is Arend Lijphart’s consociational theory (consociationalism) and Shepsle and Rabushka’s “ethnic outbidding” model.

Afrobarometer–Key Findings

The very first Afrobarometer Briefing Paper–here’s the link to a PDF version–(April 2002) presents some key findings regarding the views of African residents in about a dozen African countries on phenomena such as democracy, freedom, governance, etc. Here are a few I found interesting:

  • Corruption is seen as pervasive

Whereas about one-half of survey respondents think that corruption among public officials is common (52 percent), about one-third think it is rare (35 percent). Perceived corruption is highest in Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, and lowest in Botswana, Lesotho and Namibia. Generally, however, people perceive more corruption than they themselves have personally experienced. Such perceptions, and the social inequalities they reflect, tend to corrode satisfaction with economic reform policies and with democracy.

In class, I use the module on economic and political development as an opportunity to ask students if they have ever tried to bribe an official for any reason whatsoever. The answer amongst my mostly suburban-bred American students is a unanimous “no.” Generally only I (and sometimes a foreign student) raise our hands to answer in the affirmative. I try to impress upon the students that bribery and corruption is a normal part of life in most non-Western countries. In most citizens’ dealings with official (read: governmental and quasi-governmental) institutions, bribing at least one official is absolutely necessary to get anything done.

Continue reading “Afrobarometer–Key Findings”

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